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It is well established that associative learning, such as learning new cue-outcome pairings, 
produces changes in attention: cues that are good predictors of relevant outcomes become 
prioritized compared to those that are non-predictive or redundant. However, there is 
controversy about whether such a learnt attentional bias results from a controlled 
orientation of attention, or whether it can be involuntary in nature. In three experiments, 
participants learned that cues of certain colours were predictive or non-predictive, and we 
assessed attention to cues using a dot-probe task. On dot-probe trials, participants were 
instructed to control attention by orienting towards a cue of a certain shape (target), while 
trying to ignore another cue (distractor). Although the colours of the cues were critical for 
the associative learning task, they were irrelevant for the dot-probe task. The results show 
that, even though participants’ controlled attention was focused on the target shape (as 
evident in response times and accuracy data), response times to the probe were slower 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and error rates were higher (Experiment 2 and 3) when the 
distractor was of a (previously) predictive colour. These data suggest that attention was 
captured involuntarily by the predictive value of the distractor, despite this being 
counterproductive to the task goal. 




One of the most important tasks for humans and other animals is to learn to predict 
relevant upcoming events (outcomes) using the ongoing flow of perceived information 
(cues) (Mackintosh, 1983; Shanks, 1995). With hundreds of potential cues available in our 
environment, learning cue-outcome relationships is necessarily selective to constrain the 
cognitive processing that takes place. Attentional models of associative learning propose 
that our attention system filters information in order to focus the learning mechanism on 
those cues that will assist in making accurate predictions in the future (Esber & 
Haselgrove, 2011; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975). It is now well established that the 
process of cue-outcome learning leads to changes in attention, favouring the processing of 
predictive cues over those that are not predictive (Feldmann-Wüstefeld, Uengoer, & 
Schubö, 2015; Kruschke, Kappenman, & Hetrick, 2005; Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 
2013; Livesey, Harris, & Harris, 2009; Luque, Morís, Rushby, & Le Pelley, 2015; Luque, 
Vadillo, Gutiérrez-Cobo, & Le Pelley, 2018; Luque, Vadillo, Le Pelley, & Beesley, 2017; 
O’Brien & Raymond, 2012; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005; Wills, Lavric, Croft, & Hodgson, 
2007).  
The “learned predictive design” (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Lochmann & Wills, 
2003) has been a widely used tool for examining the formation of attentional biases in 
associative learning. In this task, participants are presented with compounds of two cues 
(e.g., two foods) and must predict which outcome will occur (e.g., one of two allergic 
reactions). Using corrective feedback, participants learn about the cue-outcome 
relationships in the task. In this design, only one cue from each pair (the predictive cue) is 
informative as to the outcome that will occur, while the other cue is non-predictive. 
Analysis of eye-gaze dwell time reveals that people typically spend more time looking at 
predictive cues compared to non-predictive cues. This suggests the formation of a 
predictiveness-driven bias of attention, which selectively enhances the processing of 
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predictive cues (Kruschke et al., 2005; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Le Pelley, Pearson, 
Porter, Yee, & Luque, 2019; Lochmann & Wills, 2003; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005; Wills et 
al., 2007) 
Despite the evidence that predictive cues are prioritized compared to those that 
are non-predictive, there is controversy about whether this attentional bias is controlled 
or automatic in nature. Indeed, the few studies investigating this issue have reached 
very different conclusions. For example, Mitchell, Griffiths, Seetoo, & Lovibond 
(2012) suggested that a predictiveness-driven bias of attention might be the 
consequence of people drawing inferences about which stimuli will be useful for 
making predictions. Mitchell et al. (Experiment 2) found evidence supporting this 
hypothesis using a two-phase learned predictiveness design. In the first phase, 
participants learned that half of the cues were predictive and the other half non-
predictive. In this phase, Mitchell et al. demonstrated a predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention, as evident in greater eye-gaze dwell time to predictive cues over non-
predictive cues. In the second phase, all cues were trained as predictive of a new set of 
outcomes and were equally good predictors of these new outcomes. 
Importantly, participants received instructions regarding the effectiveness of the two 
sets of cues. In the “change” condition, participants were instructed that those cues which 
were used to predict the outcomes in the first phase were unlikely to be useful for 
predicting outcomes in the second phase of the experiment. Participants in the 
“continuity” condition received instructions that the same cues that were useful in the first 
phase were likely to be useful in the second phase. Mitchell et al. observed a reversal of 
the predictiveness-driven bias of attention in the change condition, compared to the 
continuity condition. They argued that these data suggest that a predictiveness-driven bias 
of attention is a function of a participant’s beliefs about the usefulness of each cue, 
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strategically directed towards whichever cue is deemed to be most useful in the task. In 
this sense, the predictiveness-driven bias of attention can be characterized as the result of a 
volitional and controlled orientation of attention in accordance with the task goals. 
In a series of recent studies, Livesey and colleagues (Don & Livesey, 2015; Shone, 
Harris, & Livesey, 2015) have failed to replicate Mitchell et al.’s instructed reversal of 
the learned predictiveness effect, consistently observing an attenuation but not a complete 
reversal of the effect following reversal instructions.  These data place doubt on the claim 
that the predictiveness-driven bias of attention is entirely the result of controlled 
processes. Instead, they are more compatible with a view that a predictiveness-driven bias 
of attention can be (at least partly) automatic in nature, and that this may act in 
competition against controlled processes to weaken any attempt to reverse the attentional 
bias. 
Further evidence for an automatic component to the predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention comes from Le Pelley et al. (2013). They used a procedure in which the 
predictive value of the cues was established using the learned predictiveness design, and 
covert attentional biases were examined using a dot-probe task. In the latter, participants 
had to respond to a small probe that appeared over one of the two cues as fast as possible. 
Importantly, the probe was positioned on each cue (predictive and non-predictive) on 
exactly half of the trials, and participants were informed about this regularity of the dot-
probe task. Hence, participants were informed that they should look at the centre of the 
screen and try to ignore the cue stimuli as they were uninformative with respect to the 
position of the probe. Despite this instruction, Le Pelley et al. found that responses to the 
probe were faster when it appeared in the location of a predictive cue (note that the cue 
was predictive only in the associative learning task). This effect was evident when the 
probe appeared very shortly (250 ms) after the cues. However, when the stimulus-onset-
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asynchrony (SOA) of the probe was increased to 1000 ms, there was no effect of cue 
predictiveness on attention (see also Luque, Vadillo et al., 2017). This pattern of results 
suggests that the predictiveness-driven bias of attention is activated automatically: given 
the presentation of a predictive cue, attention is oriented towards that cue regardless of 
the participants’ effort to keep their attentional focus on the centre of the screen. This 
automatic guidance of attention took place rapidly (the 250 ms condition), but as long as 
ample time is provided (the 1000 ms condition), controlled attention can be engaged in 
order to override the initial automatic response. 
While the results obtained by Le Pelley et al. (2013) are certainly suggestive of the 
operation of an automatic predictiveness-driven bias of attention, it is still possible to 
provide a plausible account of this effect in terms of controlled attention. One could argue 
that Le Pelley et al.’s instructions (i.e., fixate centrally; do not look at the cues) did not 
provide a strong enough incentive for participants to change their controlled attentional set 
on the dot-probe trials of the task (that is, to ignore the colours of the cues). Indeed, one 
could argue that remembering and applying this instruction would have a significant 
cognitive cost. Moreover, there was no clear benefit for participants in following the 
instruction. This is because the probe stimulus appeared equally often over predictive and 
non-predictive cues, and so attending to predictive cues (i.e., maintaining the attentional 
set from the associative learning task) would lead to faster responses when the probe 
appeared over a predictive cue and slower responses when the probe appeared over a non-
predictive cue. One could imagine that the net effect of adopting this attentional set would 
be equivalent to attending centrally on all trials (which would result in matched response 
times to probes on predictive and non-predictive cues). 
A stronger test of the automaticity of a predictiveness-driven bias of attention would 
be provided by a task in which an instruction is used to direct controlled attention towards 
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a feature of the task that has a meaningful benefit to performance. We argue that such an 
explicit direction of controlled attention would counteract any strategy that might exist to 
continue attending the predictive features of the stimuli (that is, those features that are 
predictive in the associative learning task). Our aim in the current experiments is therefore 
to examine whether a predictiveness-driven bias of attention is still detected even when 
participants’ controlled attention is focused on another stimulus feature in the task. 
Importantly, this instruction was designed to offer a clear benefit to the participants. If 
participants follow the instruction, they can make faster responses to the probe on the 
majority of trials. In contrast, failure to follow the instruction has a consequence of poorer 
performance on dot-probe trials. This aspect of the dot-probe trials was made explicit in 
the instructions and was evident at the outset of the experiments. Therefore, a 
predictiveness-driven bias of attention in dot-probe trials was directly counterproductive to 
the participants’ goals of making fast and accurate responses to the probe. As a result, an 
effect of cue-predictiveness on dot-probe trials under these circumstances would provide 
strong evidence for the operation of an automatic attentional process, and would be 
difficult to reconcile with a purely strategic, controlled allocation of attention. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we investigated the automaticity of a predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention by using the procedure of Luque, Vadillo et al. (2017), which combines an 
associative learning and a dot-probe task. In the associative learning task, two coloured 
shapes (cues) appeared on each trial and participants were required to make one of two 
responses (up or down). Only one of these two cues could be used to accurately predict 
the correct response (see Table 1), and feedback was provided for incorrect responses. In 
the dot-probe task, participants had to respond with a different response set (left or right) 
to the location of a probe (a small white square, see Figure 1A). Probes were located 
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equally often over predictive and non-predictive cues. Thus, the colours of the two shapes 
were irrelevant for accurate responses on the dot-probe task. Participants were, however, 
informed that the shape of the cues would be informative as to the most probable location 
of the probe. Specifically, for majority of the trials (~80%), the probe appeared on the 
location of one particular shape. Participants were instructed to attend to this shape during 
the dot-probe trials in order to respond more quickly on the majority of those trials. Given 
the presence of this clear advantage to direct attention to one feature of the cues – that is, 
its shape – on the dot-probe trials, we can examine whether the irrelevant feature of 
colour continues to have a lasting impact on performance.  
Method 
Participants 
Previous experiments using very similar procedures have obtained a relatively 
large effect size for the predictiveness-driven bias of attention. In Luque, Vadillo et al. 
(2017), the main effect of predictiveness in RTs to the dot probe had an effect size of dz = 
0.78 (Experiment 1; N = 27) and dz = 0.82 (Experiment 2; N = 25). Since it is possible that 
controlled attention might be contributing to the size of these effects (at least to some 
extent), and since the current experiments were designed to minimize the operation of such 
controlled processes, we anticipated that current effect sizes might be smaller than in 
previous studies. As such, we sought sample sizes of at least 44 (which provides power of 
greater than .9 to detect an effect of medium size dz =.5). Our scheduled recruitment 
sessions resulted in the collection of 48 datasets. The participants were UNSW Sydney 
students who participated for course credit. All participants signed an informed consent 
form approved by the Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel of UNSW Sydney 
(Psychology) and were treated in accordance with the Helsinki declaration. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Apparatus and Materials 
Each participant was tested in an individual enclosed cubicle, housing a standard 
PC with a 58.4 cm monitor (1920 × 1080-pixel resolution, 120 Hz), at a viewing distance 
of approximately 60 cm. Stimulus presentation was controlled by MATLAB using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, Pelli, Ingling,  
Murray, & Broussard, 2007). Participants made all responses using the keys of custom 
keyboards, which provide average response latencies of around 1 millisecond (DirectIN 
keyboard, Empirisoft, New York).  
 
Figure 1. Panel A shows the trial structure for associative learning (AL) task (top) and 
dot-probe (DP) task (bottom) of Experiment 1. For associative learning trials participants 
were instructed to learn from feedback which key, A or Z, was the correct response for 
each pair of stimuli. Panel A shows the structure of a trial in which the participant made an 
error in the associative learning task. No feedback was provided on trials with correct 
responses. On dot-probe trials, the probe was presented on the position of the instructed 
shape with a probability of .8 (the square in this example, marked as .8 [congruent] in the 
figure). The remaining trials were therefore incongruent (marked as .2 [incongruent] in 
the figure). Panel B shows mean proportion of correct responses in the associative learning 
task across 24 blocks of 16 trials each. Panel C shows mean response times (RTs) for the 
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four trial types in the dot-probe task. Error bars depict the 95% Cousineau–Morey 
confidence interval for repeated measures (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). To view this 
figure in colour, please visit the online version of this journal. 
 
Cues were eight distinctly coloured shapes, four circles and four squares (squares 
sides and circles diameter of length equal to 57 mm) RGB and relative luminance (0-255 
scale) values were: red (R255, G0, B0; L54), yellow (R230, G230, B51; L217), green 
(R0, G204, B51; L150), turquoise (R51, G255, B255; L212), blue (R0, G128, B255; 
L110), magenta (R255, G51, B255; L109), brown (R153, G102, B0; L105), and salmon 
(R255, G128, B128; L155). The probe was a small white square (sides of 12 mm). 
Design 
The experiment contained two phases. In Phase 1, participants learned the cue–
response contingencies through the associative learning task. In Phase 2, participants 
continued training with these cue–response contingencies in the associative learning task 
for half of the trials, with attention measured through the dot-probe task in the other half 
of the trials. The two tasks took place on alternate trials (associative learning, dot probe, 
associative learning, dot probe, and so on). 
On associative learning trials, participants saw two cue stimuli and were required 
to make one of two responses on each trial. Table 1 shows the correct response to each of 
the eight cue compounds that were presented. Each compound contained one of four 
predictive cues (A, B, C, and D) and one of four non-predictive cues (W, X, Y, and Z). 
Each of these cues was of a different colour. The eight colours were assigned to these cues 
following a Latin-square design. The left/right position in which each cue appeared was 
also counterbalanced, so that each cue appeared in each position on half of all trials. 
Predictive cues consistently indicated the correct response during the associative learning 
trials. For example, whenever cue A appeared, the correct response was always response 
11 
 
R1. Thus, once the contingencies were learned, the participants could make these 
responses accurately using only the information provided by the predictive cues. In 
contrast, non-predictive cues provided no information regarding the correct response (e.g., 
for half of the trials on which W was presented, the correct response was R1, while for the 
other half it was R2), and therefore the correct response could not be anticipated using 
these non-predictive cues alone. 
Cue stimuli could be either circles or squares. For the subsets of predictive and 
non-predictive cues, two out of the four cues were circles and two were squares 
(determined by a Latin square design). This assignment orthogonally manipulated the 
factors of predictiveness (colour) and instruction (shape). That is, participants were 
instructed to pay attention to one particular shape on the dot probe trials, and half of the 
cues appearing in that shape were presented in a predictive colour and half were presented 
in a non-predictive colour (with respect to the outcomes of the associative learning task). 
Similarly, for those cues appearing in the shape that participants were instructed to ignore, 
half were predictive and half were non-predictive. Note that we used the same stimuli for 
the two tasks. 
The probe appeared equally often on either the left or right cue, and also equally 
often over predictive and non-predictive cues; neither the predictive value (colour) nor the 
position (right/left) of the cues was predictive of the probe position. Importantly, the 
probability that the probe appeared over the instructed shape was .8, while the probability 
that it appeared over the non-instructed shape was .2. We analysed separately the 
attentional allocation for those trials where the probe appeared over the instructed shape 
(congruent trials) and those trials where the probe appeared over the non-instructed shape 
(incongruent trials). Since the two shapes were presented equally often in predictive and 
non-predictive colours (as established in associative learning trials), we were also able to 
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measure the impact of the learned predictive value of these colours on the allocation of 
attention in dot-probe trials.  
For clarity, we can consider an example of how stimuli might be assigned to these 
different trial types. Let’s say that a participant receives the instruction that probes are 
more likely to appear over squares on dot-probe trials, and that the associative learning 
task has established that the colours yellow and green were predictive, and that the colours 
red and blue were non-predictive (note that for the real participants there were eight 
colours in total). As such, for this participant, the probe might appear on a yellow square 
for predictive-congruent trials, on a green circle for predictive-incongruent trials, on a red 
square for non-predictive-congruent trials and on a blue circle for non-predictive-
incongruent trials.  If the predictiveness-driven bias of attention in this task is fully 
determined by controlled attentional processes, we would expect participants to ignore the 
colours on dot-probe trials, and focus their attention on the relevant shape. In this case, we 
would expect a congruency effect— responses will be faster on congruent compared to 
incongruent trials— but no predictiveness effect would be observed. In contrast, should a 
predictiveness effect be observed on dot-probe trials (faster responses on previously 
predictive trials compared to non-predictive, averaged over the factor of congruency), 
despite considerable evidence that participants were following the instruction to direct 
attention towards a particular shape (i.e., in the presence of a congruency effect), this 
would suggest that the predictiveness-driven bias of attention in this task is, to some 




Table 1. Design of Experiment 1. 
 
Note: The letters A, B, C and D are used to represent the four predictive cues; the letters 
W, X, Y and Z represent the four non-predictive cues, as determined by their role in the 
associative learning task. Each cue was of a different colour (counterbalanced between 
participants). Half of the cues were circles and half squares, as indicated by the 
surrounding circles and squares for each cue. R1 and R2 were the two responses in the 
associative learning task (keys A and Z, counterbalanced between participants). 
Participants read instructions prior to Phase 2 (see online supplemental material #1 for full 
instructions), indicating that the probe was more likely to appear over one particular shape. 
In Phase 2, associative learning and dot-probe trials were presented in an alternating order. 
 
Procedure 
Initial instructions described the associative learning task: Participants were told 
that on each trial a pair of stimuli would appear and that they were required to make a 
response using either the ‘A’ or the ‘Z’ key. They were informed that their task was to 
learn the correct response for each pair of stimuli (see online supplemental material #1 for 
more details). Participants then completed the first phase of the experiment. Each 
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associative learning trial began with the presentation of a prompt, with the text “A or Z” in 
the centre of the screen (30-point Arial font for the words “A” and “Z”, 20-point for the 
word “or”) for 500ms (see Figure 1A), followed by the two cue stimuli. The prompt 
remained on the screen with the cues. Participants then made a response using the ‘A’ or 
‘Z’ keys. If the response was correct, no explicit feedback was provided, and the next trial 
began after an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1s. If the response was incorrect, then the 
message “incorrect” appeared for 3 s (white 30-point Arial font), followed by the ITI. 
Participants could take as long as they liked to make their responses in all phases. 
Trials were presented in blocks of 16 trials. Each block contained two 
presentations of each compound, once with the predictive cue on the left and once on the 
right. Following the strategy of Mitchell et al. (2012), we reduced the cognitive load of 
learning all eight compounds by having some blocks in Phase 1 in which the compounds 
were divided into two sets of four compounds. Thus in block 1.1, the first set of four 
compounds were presented for 8 trials, before the second set of compounds were 
presented for the next 8 trials. This alternating method of presenting compounds occurred 
in blocks 1, 2, 5, and 6. All other blocks in Phase 1 presented trials in a fully randomized 
fashion. Phase 1 comprised 320 associative learning trials; Phase 2 comprised 128 
associative learning trials and 128 dot-probe trials presented pseudo-randomly (see online 
supplemental material #2 for more details). 
Instructions prior to Phase 2 stated that participants would now have to perform an 
additional task in separate trials, which was to respond as rapidly as possible to the 
location of a small white square, using the left and right arrow keys. The instructions 
stated that the probe stimulus would occur on 80% of the trials over the position of a target 
shape (this was the circle for half of the participants and the square for the other half) and 
that they should “pay more attention to the [square/circle] shape”. The instructions are 
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presented in full in the online supplemental material #1. 
Each dot-probe trial began with a prompt, in which two arrows were presented in 
the centre of the screen, one pointing to the left and the other to the right, with the word 
“or” (font Arial 20- point) written between them. This prompt appeared for 500 ms (see 
Figure 1A) and was followed by the presentation of the two cue stimuli. The orders of 
associative learning and dot-probe trials were independently randomized; hence, 
participants could not anticipate which cues would appear on an upcoming dot-probe trial 
from the cues on the previous associative learning trial (and vice versa). The prompt was 
visible on the screen with the cues. After 250 ms, the probe was superimposed centrally 
on one of the cues. Probe position was determined randomly on each trial, with a .8 
probability of the probe appearing over the instructed shape (congruent trial) and a .2 
probability of the probe appearing over the non-instructed shape (incongruent trial). When 
the probe appeared on the screen, participants made a localization response using the 
arrow keys. Anticipatory responses were not allowed; participants could only respond 
when the probe stimulus was on the screen. If the response was correct, no explicit 
feedback was provided and the next trial began after an ITI of 1s. If the response was 
incorrect, then the message “incorrect” appeared for 3 s (white 30-point Arial font), 
followed by the ITI. Participants could take as long as they liked to respond to the 
localization of the probe. 
Results and Discussion 
Data pre-processing 
The trial-level raw data for all the experiments, along with the scripts used for data 
pre-processing, are publicly archived at https://osf.io/g53fk/.  
An influence of cue-predictiveness on responses in the dot-probe task could only 
be expected if participants managed to learn about the differential predictiveness of the 
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cues with respect to the associative learning task. Following Le Pelley and McLaren 
(2003, see also Le Pelley et al., 2013), the data from those participants with less than 60% 
accuracy on the associative learning task were not analysed further. Twelve participants 
were excluded on this basis. Since we were interested in the relatively rapid deployment of 
attention, we also excluded from the analysis those participants whose average response 
times on the dot-probe trials were more than 2.5 standard deviations above or below the 
group mean response time. One participant was excluded on this basis. The data from 35 
participants contributed to the final analysis. 
Statistical analyses 
All tests were performed at the α = .05 significance level. For repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), Greenhouse–Geisser alpha correction was applied when 
necessary. 
Associative learning task 
The accuracy data are presented in Figure 1B, averaged across the trials in each 
block. Participants rapidly learned the programmed contingencies and accuracy remained 
at a high level when the dot-probe task was introduced in Phase 2 (see Figure 1B). 
Dot-probe task 
Accuracy on the dot-probe task was very high (mean accuracy > 99%, SEM = 
0.011); trials on which incorrect responses were made were not included in the response 
time (RTs) analysis. 
Several measures were taken to reduce the impact of any outlying RTs, as is 
common practice in dot probe studies (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 
2004; Luque, Vadillo et al., 2017). Responses that were greater than 5000 ms and 
responses deemed to be anticipations (<200 ms) were deleted (0.5% of the remaining 
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data). RTs that were more than 2.5 SD above or below the participant’s mean RT were 
also not included in the analyses (3.1% of the remaining data). 
Figure 1C shows RTs to the probe averaged across Phase 2 trials for each of the 
experimental conditions. A 2 (instruction congruency: congruent [probe on the instructed 
shape] vs. incongruent [probe on the uninstructed shape]) × 2 (predictiveness: probe on 
the predictive cue vs. probe on the non-predictive cue) ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
instruction congruency, F(1, 34) = 23.94, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.413 (a consequence of faster 
RTs for congruent [M = 496 ms] than incongruent trials [M = 537 ms]), and a main effect 
of predictiveness, F(1, 34) = 10.23, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.231 (a consequence of faster RTs 
for probes on predictive [M = 504 ms] than non-predictive cues [M = 528 ms]). The 
instruction congruency × predictiveness interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
In Experiment 1, participants were given an associative learning task in which 
coloured cues were paired with one of two responses. Only half of the colours were 
predictive of the correct response, while the other half were non-predictive. Attentional 
orientation towards each cue was measured using the dot-probe task on separate trials. 
Importantly, on dot-probe trials, participants were provided with an instruction to attend to 
a particular shape and ignore the colour of the cues, which was irrelevant on these trials. 
The shape-instruction was indeed informative for the dot-probe task, since the probe was 
more likely to occur over that shape (with a probability of .8). These conditions were 
designed to establish an attentional set for attending only to the shape of the cues, ignoring 
the colours. 
Our data demonstrate that our task was effective in establishing this attentional set, 
as shown in the main effect of instruction congruency on RTs to the probe. That is, we 
observed faster responses to the probe when it appeared over the instructed shape, 
demonstrating that participants were clearly following the instructions given to them and 
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directing their attention towards the instructed shape. Importantly, however, the predictive 
value of the colours also modulated RTs, as revealed by the main effect of predictiveness. 
These results are difficult to reconcile with accounts that assume the predictiveness-
driven bias of attention is only the result of a controlled attentional process (Mitchell et 
al., 2012). Instead, we argue that these results provide evidence for an automatic 
component to the predictiveness-driven bias of attention, operating in parallel with the 
controlled allocation of attention. 
Experiment 2 
One potential criticism of Experiment 1 is that erroneously attending to the colour 
of the stimuli on dot-probe trials, while providing no benefit, was also not detrimental to 
performance on these trials in any meaningful way. Participants could take as long as they 
liked to respond to probe stimuli in Experiment 1, and so ignoring the instruction to attend 
to the shape would slow reaction times marginally. As such, this change in behaviour 
would be fairly inconsequential for the participant. Compelling evidence for the 
automaticity of behaviour comes from situations in which that behaviour is initiated even 
when it is counterproductive to the goal of the participant, since counterproductive 
behaviour is seldom intentional and usually reflects a lack of control, hallmarks of 
automatic processing (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Experiment 2 therefore sought 
procedures that would provide such a test.  
Several changes were made to the procedure on dot-probe trials in Experiment 2 in 
order to ensure a greater demand on attentional resources. We first changed the target probe 
stimulus to an arrow pointing up or down; participants had to respond to the orientation of 
the arrow (for consistency with Experiment 1, we continue to refer to these trials as dot-
probe trials). This arrow was not salient and its direction was not easy to discriminate, 
because (1) it was of a light-grey colour and presented over a white background and (2) a 
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very similar distractor arrow was also presented over the distractor cue1 on the opposite side 
of the screen (see Figure 2A). We also restricted presentation of the probe to just 100 ms, 
and we changed the probability of the probe position, such that it appeared over the 
instructed shape on 100% of the trials during the first (and longer) part of Phase 2 (Phase 
2.1, see above). Finally, we replaced the prompt at the beginning of the dot-probe trials with 
a representation of the instructed shape (see Figure 2A), providing a continual reminder of 
the shape that needed to be detected to enable accurate responses to the probe. 
These changes to the task increased both the need to follow closely the 
instructions to attend to the particular shape as well as the ease with which that 
instruction could be maintained. Because the dot-probe task was very demanding, if 
participants failed to follow the instruction on dot-probe trials (i.e., by maintaining an 
attentional set towards colour), participants risked making more errors in the task, which 
led to an increase in the number of “Error!” screens they experienced (with each one 
lasting 3 seconds). Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that any effect of 
predictive value on dot-probe trials would be produced by the strategic allocation of 
controlled attention towards the predictive colour of the cue. 
Method 
Participants, Apparatus and Materials 
As in Experiment 1, we aimed for a final sample size of at least 44 participants. 
Our scheduled recruitment sessions resulted in the collection of a total of 52 UNSW 
Sydney students. All participants signed an informed consent form approved by the 
Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel of UNSW Sydney (Psychology) and were treated 
 
1 Note that we often use the terms “distractor cue” and “target cue” to refer to the cues in which the distractor or 
target were embedded, even though the target and the distractor were actually the arrow stimuli. For example, 
when we say that the “distractor was of a predictive colour”, we are stating that the cue surrounding the 
distractor was of a predictive colour.  
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in accordance with the Helsinki declaration. All participants reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Panel A shows the trial structure for the dot-probe (DP) task used in Experiment 
2. Participants responded to the orientation of the probe stimulus (the “target arrow”; up or 
down), presented over one cue, as fast as possible. The probe was presented 200 ms after 
cue onset and was on screen for 100 ms. A “distractor arrow” was simultaneously 
displayed over the other cue. Panel B shows mean proportion of correct responses in the 
associative learning task. Panels C and D show the mean response times (RTs) and error 
rates, respectively, for the four trial types in the dot-probe task. Data in Panels C and D are 
the result of collapsing data on congruent trials from Phases 2.1 and 2.2 (note that the 
facto phase did not yield any significant interaction, see the main text for more details). 
Error bars depict the 95% Cousineau–Morey confidence interval for repeated measures 
(Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). To view this figure in colour, please visit the online 
version of this journal. 
 
Cue stimuli were four shapes, coloured red, yellow, green, and turquoise. As in 
Experiment 1, half of these stimuli were circles and half were squares, and they were 
assigned to design elements across participants according to a Latin square design. For 
practice trials (see below) we used a brown circle and a salmon square. Two stimuli, a 
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“target arrow” and a “distractor arrow”, were used for the dot-probe task (see Figure 2A). 
The arrows were of light grey colour (R214, G214, B215), framed on a white square 
(R255, G255, B255; 12 mm). The distractor arrow comprised two arrows superimposed, 
with one pointing up and one pointing down. The target arrow pointed either up or down 
(randomly determined on each trial). 
Design 
Experiment 2 used a simplified version of the design from Experiment 1 (see Table 
2). Participants experienced four compound cues. Cue colour was again the relevant 
feature for the associative learning task, with half of the colours predictive (A or B) and 
half non-predictive (W or X). 
 
Table 2. Design of Experiment 2. 
 
Note: Letters A and B represent the two predictive cues, while letters W and X represent 
the two non-predictive cues, as determined by their role in the associative learning task. 
Cues were of different colour. Half of the cues were circles and half squares, as indicated 
by the circles and squares surrounding each cue. R1 and R2 were the two responses in the 
associative learning task. Participants read instructions prior to Phase 2 (see online 
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supplemental material #1 for full instructions), indicating that the target would appear over 
one particular shape. In Phase 2, associative learning and dot-probe trials were presented in 
an alternating order. 
 
Given the simplified design, we trained all four compounds concurrently in the 
associative learning task. In Phase 1 the four cue-response relationships shown in Table 2 
were presented across 128 associative learning trials. Phase 2 was divided into two sub-
phases: Phase 2.1 and Phase 2.2. These sub-phases differed in terms of the dot-probe trials. 
Phase 2.1 contained only congruent dot-probe trials, such that the target probe always 
appeared in the same location as the instructed shape. In Phase 2.2, 25% of the trials were 
incongruent, such that the target probe appeared in the opposite location to that of the 
instructed shape. We included incongruent trials in Phase 2.2 in order to perform a 
manipulation check for controlled attention: if participants were paying attention to the 
instructed shape, we would expect longer RTs on incongruent trials compared to congruent 
trials. Phase 2.1 contained 96 associative learning trials and 96 dot-probe trials. Phase 2.2 
contained 64 associative learning trials and 64 dot-probe trials. Each block contained 16 
trials presented in a randomized order. 
Due to the simplified design used in Experiment 2 (compared to Experiment 1), it 
was necessary for associative learning trials to pair two squares together for one compound 
(A and W) and two circles together for one compound (B and X). This ensured that colour 
was a perfectly predictive feature of the correct response in the associative learning task 
(and shape an imperfect predictor). However, this aspect of the task means that these 
combinations could not be used in the dot-probe task, since participants who were told to 
direct their attention towards the square (for example) would not be able to direct their 
attention to a single stimulus on trials with two squares, and the instruction would be 
equally meaningless on trials with two circles. As such, cues were recombined such that 
there was always one square and one circle on every dot-probe trial. This feature of the 
23 
 
design leads to combinations of two predictive cues on 25% of all dot-probe trials, and two 
non-predictive cues on 25% of all dot-probe trials.  
Procedure 
The following changes were made to the procedure of the dot-probe task used in 
Experiment 1 (the associative learning task was identical). Participants were given 10 
practice dot-probe trials between Phases 1 and 2. For these trials, we used two cues that 
were not presented in the main experiment (see Participants, Apparatus and Materials). 
The target probe was presented on the instructed shape in all practice trials; at the end of 
practice trials, the error rate was displayed on the screen. Participants could not pass this 
screen until the experimenter checked their performance. If the error rate was higher than 
50%, the experimenter provided further instructions regarding the dot-probe trials. 
The prompt message shown at the beginning of each dot probe trial was now a 
shape, either a circle or a square, surrounded by two arrows, one pointing to the left and 
the other pointing to the right (see Figure 2). This fixation stimulus was designed to 
remind participants on each trial of the instruction to attend to that specific shape. The 
fixation stimulus was presented for 500 ms, followed by the two cues. After another 200 
ms, two probe stimuli appeared on the screen (the target and the distractor). Participants 
had to respond to the direction of the target probe, up or down, using the keys. The probes 
were displayed on screen for 100 ms before they were removed (the cues remained on the 
screen).  
Results and Discussion 
Data pre-processing 
Using the same exclusion criteria as in Experiment 1, five participants were 
removed from the final sample (four participants due to poor accuracy in the associative 
learning task, and one participant due to excessively slow responses in the dot-probe task). 
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Trial exclusion criteria were identical to Experiment 1. Participants made inaccurate 
responses on 21% of all dot-probe trials and these were removed from the RT analysis. 
This large number of errors indicates that, as expected, the task posed a greater demand on 
attentional resources. As in Experiment 1, probe responses that were very fast (less than 
200 ms) or very slow (over 5000 ms) were also removed from the analysis (0.3% of the 
remaining trials). Dot-probe trials with outlier RTs (greater or less than 2.5 standard 
deviations from the participant’s mean RT) were also excluded from analysis (3.6% of the 
remaining trials). 
Associative learning task 
Figure 2B shows the accuracy data for each learning block across Phases 1, 2.1 
and 2.2 (see the online supplemental material #2 for more details about the formation of 
these blocks). It is evident that participants learned to make correct responses in Phase 1. 
The introduction of the dot-probe task had very little impact on the associative learning 
task performance in the second phase. 
Dot-probe task 
Manipulation check. The inclusion of incongruent trials during Phase 2.2 allowed 
us to check whether the participants were orientating their attention in a controlled manner 
to the instructed shape. If this was the case, we would expect slower and less accurate 
responses for incongruent trials, in which the probe was positioned over the non-instructed 
shape, compared to congruent trials, in which the probe was positioned over the instructed 
shape. This was true for RTs (congruent = 857 ms; incongruent = 1096 ms), t(46) = 7.48, p 
< .001, dz = 1.091, and accuracy (congruent = 78%; incongruent = 65%), t(46) = 5.29, p < 
.001, dz = 0.771. 
Main analysis: RTs. With the exception of the manipulation check analysis, we 
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only analysed congruent trials, in which the probe appeared over the instructed (or target) 
shape. Dot-probe trials formed a 2 (target predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 
2 (distractor predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) design. Target predictiveness 
indicates whether the instructed shape was presented in a predictive or non-predictive 
colour. Distractor predictiveness indicates whether the non-instructed shape was presented 
in a predictive or non-predictive colour (see Figure 2). The effect of predictiveness, if any, 
should be evident in faster and/or more accurate responses for target predictive conditions, 
and in slower and/or less accurate responses for distractor predictive conditions. 
Figure 2C shows mean RTs of probe responses on congruent trials in the dot-probe 
task (collapsed over Phases 2.1 and 2.2).  A 2 (phase: Phase 2.1 vs. Phase 2.2) × 2 (target 
predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 2 (distractor predictiveness: predictive vs. 
non-predictive) ANOVA yielded a main effect of target predictiveness, F(1, 46) = 9.47, p 
= .004, ηp2 = 0.171 (faster RTs when the instructed shape was presented in a predictive 
colour [M = 840 ms] than when it was presented in a non-predictive colour [M = 864 ms]), 
and a main effect of distractor predictiveness, F(1, 46) = 6.28, p = .016, ηp2 = 0.120 
(slower RTs for predictive [M = 864 ms] than non-predictive distractor colours [M = 841 
ms]). None of the remaining effects were significant (largest F < 1).  
Main analysis: Accuracy. Figure 2D shows mean accuracy of probe responses on 
congruent trials in the dot-probe task (collapsed over Phases 2.1 and 2.2). A 2 (phase: 
Phase 2.1 vs. Phase 2.2) × 2 (target predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 2 
(distractor predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
phase, F(1, 46) = 8.31, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.153 (higher accuracy during Phase 2.1 [M = 
81.2% of trials featuring correct responses] compared to Phase 2.2 [M = 78.2%]), a main 
effect of target predictiveness, F(1, 46) = 4.65, p = .036, ηp2 = 0.092 (more accurate 
responses when the target was of a predictive colour [M = 81.0%] than when it was of a 
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non-predictive colour [M = 78.5%]),  and a main effect of distractor predictiveness, F(1, 
46) = 4.44, p = .040, ηp2 = 0.088 (less accurate responses when the distractor was of a 
predictive colour [M = 78.5%] than when it was of a non-predictive colour [M = 80.9%]). 
None of the remaining effects were significant (larger F < 1).   
In summary, predictive cues (colours) modulated attention even when participants’ 
controlled attention was set for attending to the shape of the stimuli. This predictiveness-
driven bias of attention was clearly counterproductive for the participants, producing 
slower and less accurate responses (and therefore incurring more “Error!” penalty screens) 
on those trials in which the non-instructed distractor shape was of a predictive colour. It is 
highly unlikely that participants were voluntarily orientating their controlled attention 
towards the predictive colour, since any residual attention to colour in dot-probe trials 
would lead to a clear disadvantage. Therefore, the most likely account of these results is 
that the attentional bias is elicited automatically by the predictive features of the stimuli. 
Experiment 3 
We have argued that the attentional bias to predictive colours during the dot-
probe task was not the result of a controlled attentional process in Experiment 2 because 
(1) participants were voluntarily allocating attention to the instructed shape and (2) 
paying attention to the predictive colour was disadvantageous (it led to more errors being 
committed and therefore more timeout penalties). It is notable, however, that the current 
procedure requires participants to perform frequent reconfigurations of their attentional 
set from trial to trial, switching attention between the relevant features for the associative 
learning task (the colours) and the relevant features for the dot-probe tasks (the shape). It 
is well-known that task-set reconfiguration implies a significant cognitive cost (e.g., 
Forrest, Monsell, & McLaren, 2014; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). It is therefore possible 
that participants consciously kept two attentional sets activated during Phase 2 in order to 
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save cognitive resources: to attend to the two predictive colours and to the instructed 
shape. It could be argued that the cost of maintaining the attentional set for the predictive 
colours (an increase in errors), might had been balanced out by a significant reduction in 
the overall cognitive cost of the task.  
If that was the case, the predictiveness-driven bias of attention detected in 
Experiment 1 and 2 would be due to participants’ unwillingness or incapacity (because 
of insufficient cognitive resources) to change their attentional set, and not due to the 
automatic capture of attention. To test this alternative hypothesis, we grouped associative 
learning and dot-probe trials in runs of eight trials (eight associative learning trials, then 
eight dot-probe trials, and so on) in the 8-trial run group of participants. We compared 
this group with a group completing the same task as in the Experiment 2, that is, with 
associative learning and dot-probe tasks alternating between each other on every trial 
(i.e., the 1-trial run group). The rationale for this manipulation was that it should be less 
cognitively demanding for our participants to change their attentional set when trials are 
arranged in runs of eight, because this condition has fewer task alternations and allows 
more time for adapting to the ongoing task. Therefore, any reluctance to change 
attentional sets from associative learning to dot-probe trials should be reduced in the 8-
trial run group as compared to the 1-trial run group. If the predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention detected in Experiments 1 and 2 was due to the participants being unwilling (or 
unable) to change their attentional set, then we should find weaker predictiveness effects 
for the 8-trial run group than for the 1-trial run group in Experiment 3. On the other 
hand, if the predictive value of the cues automatically captures attention, as we contend, 
then predictiveness-driven effects should be relatively resistant, even for long runs of 
dot-probe trials (Jiang, Swallow, & Rosenbaum, 2012). 
At this point it may be questioned why we did not separate all associative 
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learning and dot-probe trials into two entirely separate stages. While such a separation 
would provide the optimum conditions for engaging with each attentional set in turn, this 
method of presentation would ultimately lead to extinction of the associations acquired 
through the associative learning task. Thus, the predictive colours would soon become 
non-predictive, given a sufficient number of dot-probe trials in a row. In this situation, 
the absence of a predictiveness-driven attentional bias in dot-probe trials would not be 
informative with respect to learnt biases of attention. The use of the 8-trial run condition, 
in contrast, provides a procedure in which extinction effects would be minimal, but a 
reasonable length of trials is provided on each task, saving cognitive resources and, 
hence, favouring the engagement of the appropriate attentional set for each task. 
Method 
Participants, Apparatus and Materials 
We estimated sample size for each group using the effect size of the mean effect of 
distractor predictiveness on dot-probe accuracy in order to achieve at least an 80% power 
for obtaining that effect. Because this effect size was ηp2 = 0.088 in Experiment 2, the 
sample size should be 52 participants per group. A total of 104 participants from the 
Autonomous University of Madrid took part in Experiment 3 for course credit. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the two conditions (51 in the 1-trial run group; 53 
in the 8-trial run group). All participants signed an informed consent form approved by the 
Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel of the Autonomous University of Madrid 
(Psychology) and were treated in accordance with the Helsinki declaration. All reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The apparatus and stimuli were identical to 
Experiment 2. 
Design and procedure 
The design and procedure for the 1-trial run group were as in Experiment 2. For 
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the 8-trial run group, the only difference was that the associative learning and dot-probe 
trials were presented in runs of 8 trials. That is, for each block of 16 intermixed 
associative learning and dot-probe trials for the 1-trial run group, the 8-trial run group 
received all 8 associative learning trials and then all 8 dot-probe trials. For all 
participants in the 8-trial run condition, the first run (starting just after the instruction 
between Phase 1 and 2) consisted of associative learning trials. 
Results and Discussion 
Data pre-processing 
Using the same exclusion criteria as in Experiments 1 and 2, seven participants 
were removed from the final sample (six participants due to poor accuracy in the 
associative learning task, and one participant due to excessively slow responses in the dot-
probe task). Trial exclusion criteria were identical to Experiment 1 and 2. Participants 
made inaccurate responses on 21% of all dot-probe trials and these were removed from the 
RT analysis. Probe responses that were very fast or very slow were also removed from the 
analysis (0.2% of the remaining trials). Dot-probe trials with RTs lying more than 2.5 
standard deviations above or below each participant’s mean were also excluded from 




Figure 3. Mean proportion of correct responses in the associative learning task in both 
groups of participants from Experiment 3 (solid line: 1-trial run group; dashed line: 8-trial 
run group). Each block represents the proportion of correct responses for 16 associative 
learning trials.  
 
Associative learning task 
Figure 3 shows the accuracy data for each learning block from Experiment 3. It is 
evident that participants learned to make correct responses in both groups. A 2 (run 
length: 1-trial run vs. 8-trial run) × 18 (block) ANOVA on these data yielded a main 
effect of block, F(4.48, 420.39) = 75.76, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.444. None of the remaining 
effects were significant; the largest F was for the non-significant main effect of run 
length (F = 2.04, p = .156). If we consider only the data from Phase 2, a 2 (run length: 1-
trial run vs. 8-trial run) × 10 (block) ANOVA yielded a main effect of run length, F(1, 
95) = 4.11, p = .046, ηp2 = 0.041. None of the remaining effects were significant (largest 
F = 1.45, p = .185). The main effect of run length is explained by poorer performance in 
the 1-trial run group (95% of correct responses) than in the 8-trial run group (97%). This 
effect is likely to reflect greater between-task interference in the 1-trial run group (c.f. 
Forrest et al., 2014). 
Dot-probe task 
Manipulation check. The congruity effect (Phase 2.2) was significant for RTs and 
accuracy data in both groups [1-trial run – RT:  congruent = 913 ms, incongruent = 1086 
ms, t(44) = 6.49, p < .001, dz = 0.97; 1-trial run – accuracy:  congruent = 76%, incongruent 
= 69%, t(44) = 2.97, p = .005, dz = 0.44; 8-trial run – RT: congruent = 867 ms, incongruent 
= 1112 ms, t(51) = 9.44, p < .001, dz = 1.31; 8-trial run – accuracy:  congruent = 79%, 
incongruent = 66%, t(51) = -5.62, p < .001, dz = 0.78]. These results indicate that 
participants in both groups were orientating their controlled attention towards the 
instructed shape during dot-probe trials. 
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Main analysis: RTs. As in Experiment 2, we only analysed congruent trials, in 
which the probe appeared over the instructed (or target) shape. Considering that the factor 
of phase is not crucial for testing our hypotheses, we decided to include all congruent 
trials from Phase 2.1 and 2.2 without including phase as a factor. This way we made the 
analyses more straightforward by avoiding 4-factor ANOVAs2.  
Figure 4A shows mean RTs of probe responses on congruent trials in the dot-probe 
task. These RT data were submitted to a 2 (run length: 1-trial run vs. 8-trial run) × 2 
(target predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 2 (distractor predictiveness: 
predictive vs. non-predictive) ANOVA which yielded a main effect of run length, F(1, 95) 
= 17.87, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.158 (faster RTs for the 8-trial run [M = 836 ms] than for the 1-
trial run group [M = 921 ms]). None of the remaining effects or interactions were 
significant (larger F = 2.18, p = .143). 
 
2 For the ANOVAs that included phase as a factor, all the significant effects reported in the main text were also 
significant. Additionally, for the RT analysis, we found a significant run length × phase interaction (p = .004), 
and a run length × distractor predictiveness × phase interaction (p = .039). The latter effect is explained because 
the distractor predictiveness effect (slower responses when the distractor was predictive) was larger in Phase 
2.2, and mostly for the 8-trial run group. This result does not conflict with the interpretations of the data in the 
article, which are supported primarily by the distractor predictiveness effect found in accuracy data. For this 
reason, we have not included further discussion of the interactions with phase. Accuracy results did not yield 





Figure 4. Panels A and B show the mean response times (RTs) and error rates on dot-
probe trials from Experiment 3. Graphs on the left side of the figure show data from the 1-
trial run group of participants (i.e., associative learning and dot-probe trials alternated 
every trial in Phase 2); graphs at the right show data from the 8-trial run group of 
participants (i.e., associative learning and dot-probe trials were grouped in runs of 8 trials 
of each type). Error bars depict the 95% Cousineau–Morey confidence interval for 
repeated measures (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). To view this figure in colour, please 
visit the online version of this journal. 
 
The 8-trial run procedure afforded the opportunity to examine whether the 
attentional bias changed over the course of the 8 dot-probe trials. It is known that 
automatic attentional biases can be resistant to extinction of associations, demonstrating 
biases even when they are no longer advantageous (Jiang et al., 2012). In order to do this, 
we collapsed the data across the factor of block, but introduced the factor of “position” (1-
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8). There were a few cases in which a participant did not have any data in one of these 
positions (i.e., the 10 trials were either inaccurate, or were removed by the exclusion 
criteria). In these rare cases (1.8%), we replaced the empty cell with the group mean for 
that position. These RT data from the 8-trial run group were submitted to a 2 (target 
predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 2 (distractor predictiveness: predictive vs. 
non-predictive) × 8 (position: 1-8) ANOVA which yielded a main effect of position, 
F(3.19, 162.49) = 30.74, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.376 (slower RTs for the first positions in each 
run, see Figure 5A), a marginally significant main effect of target predictiveness, F(1, 51) 
= 3.20, p = .080, ηp2 = 0.059 (faster RTs when the instructed shape was presented in a 
predictive colour [M = 834 ms] than when it was presented in a non-predictive colour [M 
= 847 ms]), and a marginally significant main effect of distractor predictiveness, F(1, 51) 
= 3.16, p = .081, ηp2 = 0.058 (slower RTs when the distractor shape was presented in a 
predictive colour [M = 845 ms] than when it was presented in a non-predictive colour [M 
= 836 ms]). None of the remaining effects or interactions were significant (larger F = 1.24, 
p = .279). 
Main analysis: Accuracy. Figure 4B shows mean error rated of probe responses on 
congruent trials in the dot-probe task. A 2 (run length: 1-trial run vs. 8-trial run) × 2 (target 
predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 2 (distractor predictiveness: predictive vs. 
non-predictive) ANOVA yielded a main effect of run length, F(1, 95) = 12.48, p = .001, 
ηp2 = 0.116 (better performance for 8-trial run participants [M = 82.2% of trials featuring 
correct responses] than for 1-trial run participants [M = 77.9 %]), a marginal effect of 
target predictiveness, F(1, 95)  = 3.81, p = .054, ηp2 = 0.039 (more accurate responses 
when the instructed shape was of a predictive colour [M = 80.7%] than when it was of a 
non-predictive colour [M = 79.4%]) and a main effect of distractor predictiveness, F(1, 95) 
= 14.64, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.134 (less accurate responses when the non-instructed shape was 
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of a predictive colour [M = 78.7%] than when it was of a non-predictive colour [M = 
81.4%]). For the remaining effects or interactions, the larger F was 1.82, p = .181. 
We conducted a Bayesian t-test for quantifying the (null) effect of run length on the 
magnitude of the distractor predictiveness effect. We used the default Cauchy distribution 
prior centred on the null with a width of 0.707 which is the default in JASP. The BF10 for 
obtaining a larger distractor predictiveness effect in the 1-trial run group was 0.189, which 
is considered substantial evidence favouring the null (Wetzels et al., 2011). 
We also analysed whether there was evidence for a change in the attentional bias 
during the run of 8 dot-probe trials in the accuracy data. As in the case of RT, accuracy 
data from the 8-trial run group were submitted to a 2 (target predictiveness: predictive vs. 
non-predictive) × 2 (distractor predictiveness: predictive vs. non-predictive) × 8 (position: 
1-8) ANOVA which yielded a main effect of position, F(7, 357) = 8.18, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.138 (less accurate responses for the first trials of each run, see Figure 5B), a marginally 
significant main effect of target predictiveness, F(1, 51) = 3.26, p = .077, ηp2 = 0.060 
(more accurate responses when the instructed shape was presented in a predictive colour 
[M = 83.1%] than when it was presented in a non-predictive colour [M = 81.2%]) and a 
main effect of distractor predictiveness, F(1, 51) = 6.60, p = .013, ηp2 = 0.115 (less 
accurate responses when the distractor shape was presented in a predictive colour [M = 
80.8%] than when it was presented in a non-predictive colour [M = 83.4%]). None of the 
remaining effects were significant (larger F = 1.10, p = .299). 
In summary, we observed significant effects of cue-predictiveness on dot-probe 
responses which was not affected by run length, especially in the accuracy analysis. 
Therefore, despite the fact that participants in the 8-trial run condition had a significantly 
longer period over which their attentional set could be directed towards a single set of 
features, the effect of cue-predictiveness was still observed and was as strong as in the 1-
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trial run condition. Given the considerable extra time and cognitive resources available in 
the 8-trial run condition to change their attentional set from attending to the predictive 
colours to the instructed shape (compared to the 1-trial run condition), it seems unlikely 
that the predictiveness-driven bias of attention in this condition would result from a 
conscious decision to maintain attention to the predictive colours on dot-probe trials in 
order to minimise the impact on cognitive resources. Furthermore, we found that the 
magnitude of the cue-predictiveness effect was consistent across the run of 8 dot-probe 
trials, which demonstrates that the irrelevant cues (the colours, which were relevant only in 
the associative learning task) continued to exert an influence on attention, even when 
participants had been given extended time to adjust their attentional set with successive 
dot-probe trials (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Panels A and B show the mean response times (RTs) and error rates on dot-
probe trials for the 8-trial run group in Experiment 3, respectively. Graphs represent the 
data across the eight trial when averaged by each individual trial within each run.  On the 
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left side are shown the data divided by their target and distractor predictiveness. On the 
right, target and distractor predictiveness main effects are shown. These effects were 
calculated by subtracting the condition in which are expected smaller values to the 
condition with larger values, so “magnitude” values tend to be positive. For instance, for 
the magnitude of the target predictiveness effect in RTs, we subtracted the RTs of trials 
featuring non-predictive targets to the RTs from trials with predictive targets. At the right 
end of these bars we represent the values when we collapsed by trial (marked in the X-axis 
as ‘All’). Error bars (only for the main effect graphs) depict the 95% confidence interval 
for repeated measures. To view this figure in colour, please visit the online version of this 
journal.  
General Discussion 
Across three experiments, we assessed the automaticity of learned attentional 
biases towards predictive cues. In a simple associative learning task, participants made 
responses to compounds of two cues. The colour of the cues was relevant for the response 
in this task, with one cue being predictive of the correct response, and the other one non-
predictive. On separate trials, we assessed attention to cues using a dot-probe task. In this 
task, participants were instructed that the goal was to direct their attention to a particular 
shape. In Experiment 1, participants were told that the probe was more likely to appear 
over one particular stimulus shape. Indeed, the probe did appear over the instructed shape 
on ~80% of all dot-probe trials. Despite this, response times to probes revealed that 
participants continued to pay attention to the predictive colours over the non-predictive 
colours, even though shape was the only relevant feature in the dot-probe task.  
In Experiment 2 we made the probe stimulus significantly harder to detect, and 
participants experienced a long period in which probes always appeared over the instructed 
shape. The changes to the dot-probe task meant that the maintenance of a strategic goal of 
attending to predictive colours in the dot-probe task was counterproductive, and this 
feature of the design was made clear to the participants through the instructions we 
provided, as well as through their experience with the task. Despite these changes, 
response times and accuracy were affected by the colour of the stimuli, suggesting that 
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attention is automatically allocated to stimuli with predictive value, despite the presence of 
an ongoing goal of searching for a different feature.  
In Experiment 3, we included a condition in which associative learning and dot-
probe trials were separated into runs of eight consecutive trials of each type. We argued 
that this condition would reduce cognitive demands and therefore increase the opportunity 
for participants to successfully adopt the relevant attentional set for each task. Despite this, 
we observed a predictiveness effect in the dot-probe trials for this condition, and there was 
no difference in the predictiveness effect observed in this condition compared to a 
condition in which the trials alternated. These data suggest that the effect of predictive 
value on performance during dot-probe trials is unlikely to be due to an inability to 
maintain an effective attentional set. The claim that the predictiveness effect on dot-probe 
trials is driven by an automatic allocation of attention is further supported by the finding 
that the effect did not diminish across the run of 8 dot-probe trials, and is thus not simply a 
result of participants failing to engage controlled attention on the first few dot-probe trials.  
It is noteworthy that the pattern of effects in Experiment 3 was not identical to that 
observed in Experiment 2. Notably there was no overall effect of cue predictiveness on 
RTs in Experiment 3, while there was an effect in Experiment 2. It is possible that this 
inconsistency reflects a Type I or Type II error (in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively). 
Importantly, in both Experiments 2 and 3, the predictiveness of the cues influenced 
responses on dot-probe trials in the accuracy measure. In both experiments, the predictive 
value of the distractor affected participants’ accuracy responding to the probe (located on 
the target), most likely because (previously) predictive distractors captured their attention 
more than (previously) non-predictive distractors. 
We have argued that this non-productive attentional bias towards predictive 
colours cannot be solely the product of a controlled attentional mechanism. This is 
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particularly true in Experiments 2 and 3, since in these experiments the target probe was 
always positioned over the instructed shape during Phase 2.1, and participants received a 
reminder of the instructed shape at the beginning of every trial. Also, in this task 
participants were required to locate the target within 100 ms of it appearing, ensuring 
attention would need to be rapidly allocated to the instructed shape on each trial. Failure 
to do so would increase the risk of making errors, which would result in a significant 
timeout penalty, such as looking at a screen with the message “Error!” written on it. This 
effect was apparent regardless of whether participants experienced one or eight 
consecutive dot-probe trials, suggesting that the effect was not due to the lack of cognitive 
resources, necessary for changing between attentional sets. We are arguing that it is 
therefore improbable that participants chose to strategically allocate attention towards the 
predictive colours of the cues on dot-probe trials. The results are, therefore, hard to 
reconcile with a purely controlled-attention account of a predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2012). In contrast, this pattern of results is consistent with 
the view that, once developed, a predictiveness-driven bias of attention is not fully 
controllable (Don & Livesey, 2013; Shone et al., 2015) and may be triggered 
automatically by the perception of a predictive feature, even when controlled processing 
is focused on other perceptual features. 
The current findings provide further support to the recent literature suggesting that 
attentional biases to predictive cues might be automatically elicited by stimuli (e.g., 
Cobos, Vadillo, Luque, & Le Pelley, 2018; Feldmann-Wüstefeld et al., 2015; Le Pelley et 
al., 2013). For example, Feldmann-Wüstefeld et al. (2015) used ERPs and RT 
measurements of attention to cues during a visual search task. These cues had been trained 
as predictive and non-predictive in a previous associative learning task, and during the 
visual search task, cues from the associative learning task were used as distractors. 
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Participants were instructed to ignore these cues and focus on the target of the visual 
search task. However, ERP and RT data showed that a (previously) predictive distractor 
was attended more and caused a greater disruption to target localisation than a 
(previously) non-predictive distractor. 
Cobos et al. (2018) used a procedure similar to the one used in the current study to 
examine whether an attentional bias towards a predictive cue has to result necessarily from 
a trial-by-trial learning procedure, or can instead result from explicit instructions. In their 
experiment, participants first learned that cues were either predictive or non-predictive of 
a response in an associative learning task, before receiving instructions stating that the 
predictiveness of some cues would change in a second stage. Some of the previously non-
predictive cues became predictive, and vice versa. For other cues, their predictive value 
remained the same in this second stage. Attention to cues in this second stage was 
measured through a dot-probe task. Results revealed a rapid attentional bias towards those 
cues trained as predictive in the initial associative learning task in Stage 1. Furthermore, 
this bias was unaffected by verbal instructions. This result suggests that an attentional bias 
to predictive cues is more strongly influenced by our prior experience during training than 
by explicit knowledge acquired via instruction, and is therefore compatible with an 
automatic allocation of attention to predictive cues. 
These experiments show convergent evidence of a non-strategic attentional bias to 
predictive cues. However, in all of them, the observed attentional bias to predictive cues 
did not result in a significant penalty to the participants’ performance on the task. Yet the 
strongest evidence for the operation of the automaticity of a cognitive process is found in 
behaviour that is counter-productive to the goals of the agent. We argue that recent work 
has failed to satisfy this criterion for automaticity. For instance, in Feldmann-Wüstefeld et 
al.’s (2015) experiments, the RT differences between those trials with a predictive 
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distractor and those trials with a non-predictive distractor are small (~30 ms), and lead to 
negligible effects on the experience of the participant. Thus, when these participants were 
faced with the visual search task, it might be argued that there was very little motivation to 
avoid looking at the distracting stimuli. In contrast, in our second and third experiment, 
looking at the distractor increased the chance of missing the target, and this had a real 
consequence in the form of making more errors, resulting in significant timeout penalties. 
Even under these circumstances, participants demonstrated a counterproductive attentional 
bias towards the distractor, implying that this attentional bias was generated automatically.  
In addition to the predictiveness-driven bias of attention, recent data suggest that 
attention can also be modulated by the incentive value of the predicted outcome. For 
instance, if participants experience that cue A is consistently paired with gaining $1 (a 
high-value outcome), and cue B is consistently paired with gaining $0.01 (a low-value 
outcome), then cue A will receive prioritization for processing by the attentional system 
(compared to cue B). This value-driven bias of attention has been obtained with a variety 
of attentional measurements, such as eye-gaze dwell time (Le Pelley et al., 2019), 
response time for visual search (Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015), and the 
activity of neural mechanisms reflecting attention (Luque et al., 2015). 
Recent experiments have shown that a value-driven bias of attention arises 
independently of participants’ top-down attentional set (Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le 
Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Luque, Beesley et al., 2017; Munneke, 
Hoppenbrouwers, & Theeuwes, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & Le Pelley, 2015; 
Theeuwes, 2018). For instance, in Le Pelley et al. (2015) participants received monetary 
reward for correctly responding to a target stimulus, which was placed among distractors. 
Crucially, the colour of one of the distractors determined the size of the reward: one 
colour indicated that the reward would be large, while the other indicated that the reward 
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would be small. Response times and eye-gaze analyses revealed that participants cannot 
avoid looking at the coloured distractor on some trials. Notably, attentional capture by the 
distractor was more frequent when the high-value cue was present (which signalled large 
reward) than when the low-value cue was present. It was argued that this value-driven bias 
of attention was counterproductive for participants, since greater distraction by high-value 
cues meant forgoing larger rewards overall. As such, the attentional bias is likely to be 
automatic in nature and unlikely to be a result of participants’ top-down attentional set, 
which should focus attention towards ignoring the distractors, regardless of their colour. 
Le Pelley et al.’s (2015) results (see also Pearson et al., 2015) suggest that a 
value-driven bias of attention can be elicited automatically. Consistent with these 
findings, the results from the current study indicate that the predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention can also take place automatically. Together they suggest that the attention 
devoted to a cue is determined by its acquired value: regardless of whether the cue 
signals an upcoming high-value reward, or whether it is useful in predicting a valid 
response, the more the cue is valuable for the organism the more automatic attention it 
will receive. While this generality is true, there are some notable differences between the 
present effects and those observed in some value-driven studies that should be further 
explored before concluding that both effects represent different sides of the same coin. 
Importantly, for the value-driven effect, it has been shown that value still captures 
attention when participants are actively trying to avoid the valuable distractor (e.g., 
Pearson et al., 2015). This was achieved by monitoring eye-movements in real-time 
during visual search; using those data, researchers programmed the task so that 
participants miss the reward on all trials in which they directly looked at the distractor. 
Therefore, in the experiments by Pearson et al. (2015), (1) when a participant missed a 
target, it was a consequence of looking at the distractor and (2) the participants were 
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aware that they were missing rewards because of this behaviour. In order to further 
explore the similarities of these two attentional biases, future experiments could combine 
the present procedure with the eye-tracking procedure from Pearson et al. (2015) and 
examine how these changes in the procedure might affect the present results. 
Our data stand in contrast to those of Mitchell et al. (2012), who found evidence 
supporting a purely controlled account for the predictiveness-driven bias of attention. 
Mitchell et al. examined attention to cues by assessing the total dwell time to cues over a 
period of 1.25 seconds, observing that over that period of time, participants were able to 
direct their attention strategically, in line with the instructions they had been given. 
Mitchell et al. suggested in their analysis that one could argue that “…the automatic 
component of the eye-gaze response occurs earlier than this … Perhaps people fixate on 
the previously predictive [non-instructed] stimuli before they fixate on the previously 
nonpredictive [instructed] stimuli. The data did not support this prediction.” (p. 199) 
However, we argue that the use of a global dwell-time measure may be insensitive to 
detect a potentially transient automatic bias of attention. Thus, the data from Mitchell et 
al. can be reconciled with the current results if we make the reasonable assumption that 
the automatic component reflects a transient allocation of processing resources and that 
controlled processes override this allocation at longer durations. Indeed, when a dot-
probe task is used, a predictiveness-driven bias of attention is observed when probes 
appear relatively soon after the presentation of the cue on the screen (SOAs of 200-350 
ms), but is not observed when longer SOAs are used (e.g., Le Pelley et al., 2013; Luque, 
Vadillo et al., 2017). 
Recently, there has been extensive research on selection history effects on 
attention. Selection history has been described as “the recent history of attentional 
deployments” (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012, p. 437). In other words, what is 
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attended in the past will be attended in the future. It can be argued that a predictiveness-
driven bias of attention is part of the family of effects produced by differences in 
selection history (Awh et al., 2012). According to this characterisation, since predictive 
cues are probably attended more often than non-predictive cues during the associative 
learning task, they will also be prioritised in the dot-probe task. Although this is an 
interesting possibility, more research is needed in order to be sure if a predictiveness-
driven bias of attention is merely a result of selection history. To be noted, the aim of the 
current study was to test to what extent the predictiveness-driven bias of attention is 
beyond participants’ voluntary control. Whether the learned predictiveness-driven bias of 
attention is part of the selection history family of attentional effects, or it constitutes an 
independent source of bias, is a different question. To investigate whether selection 
history and predictive value can independently affect attention would need a different 
experimental design in which these two factors are uncoupled. 
Finally, it is worth noting that it is also possible that the predictiveness-driven bias 
of attention observed in the current dot-probe task was a result of biases in covert 
attention rather than a manifestation in overt orienting. On dot-probe trials, participants 
were told to fixate centrally until the cues appeared and then to rapidly orient attention 
towards the instructed shape. Since overt attentional movements are necessarily preceded 
by shifts of covert attention (e.g., Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 
2004), it is possible that in our task the presence of a predictive cue engages covert 
attentional processing prior to target localization. This early engagement of covert 
attention might lead to an effect of cue-predictiveness in the dot-probe task, either by 
facilitating localization of the target when the probe appears over a predictive colour, or 
hindering it when the probe appears over a non-predictive colour and when a distractor is 
of a predictive colour. Future research might investigate this issue, by measuring initial 
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saccades during dot-probe trials.  
Conclusions 
Consistent with the predictions derived from attentional theories of learning (e.g., 
Mackintosh, 1975) and previous data (Le Pelley et al., 2013), our study shows that cue–
response learning can bias our attention towards predictive cues. For the first time, we 
show that this predictiveness-driven bias of attention occurs even when the attention paid 
to the predictive cue was evidently counterproductive to the main goal of the 
participants. These data offer new insights into characteristics of learned biases of 
attention, suggesting that two different attentional processes might occur in parallel and 
as early as ~200 ms after cue presentation: automatic orientation, probably driven by the 
value of the cues, as determined by error correction mechanisms (e.g., Mackintosh, 
1975); and also controlled orientation, determined by the current subjective value of the 
cues, which may be allocated more flexibly and determined by a variety of factors 
(including instructions and the goals of the agent). In addition, our study demonstrates a 
useful protocol that could have wider applications, for instance, in examining the role 
that learned biases of attention play in psychopathologies (e.g., OCD: Amir, Najmi, & 
Morrison, 2009; eating disorders: Rieger et al., 1998). Future research may investigate to 
what extent populations exhibiting these maladaptive behaviours show variations in the 
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